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Abstract. The blockchain space is changing constantly. New chains are
being implemented frequently with different use cases in mind. As more
and more types of crypto assets are getting real world value there is an
increasing need for blockchain interoperability. Exchange services today
are still dominated by central parties which require custody of funds.
This trust imposes costs and security risks as frequent breaches testify.
Atomic cross-chain swaps (ACCS) allow mutual distrusting parties to se-
curely exchange crypto assets in a peer-to-peer manner while preserving
self-custody. Fundamental ACCS protocols [40,29] leveraged the script-
ing capabilities of blockchains to conditionalize the transfer of funds
between trading parties. Recent work [42,36] showed that such proto-
cols can be realized in a scriptless setting. This has many benefits to
blockchains throughput, efficiency of swap protocols and also to fungi-
bility and privacy. The proposed protocols are limited to blockchains
supporting either Schnorr or ECDSA signatures that are sharing the
same elliptic curve parameters.
In this work we present JugglingSwap, a scriptless atomic cross-chain
swap protocol with a higher degree of interoperability. We weaken the
assumptions about blockchains that can be included in the ACCS proto-
col, and only require that (1) a threshold variant exists to the underlying
digital signature scheme and (2) it is based on the elliptic curve discrete
logarithm problem (ECDLP). The fair exchange is achieved by a grad-
ual release of secrets. To achieve this we use a new building block we
call Juggling : a public key verifiable encryption [15] scheme to transfer
segments of secret shares between parties, which can also be of separate
interest. Juggling is then tailored to a specific private key management
system design with threshold signatures security.
1 Introduction
1.1 Background
The problem of fair exchange is how two mutually distrusting parties can jointly
exchange digital assets such that each party receives the other party’s input or
neither does. There exist a variety of fair exchange protocols in the literature,
all with their own specifications and system model. We divide fair exchange
protocols to three categories:
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– Trusted Third Party: fair exchange becomes trivial if both parties can agree
on a mutual trusted third party. The parties will send the trusted party
the digital assets. The trusted party will verify correctness and redistribute
to the counterparty. To make it a more scalable solution there is a line of
research to design optimistically fair protocols, such that the trusted third
party gets involved only in case of disputes which are assumed to be rare
[6,30,38].
– Gradual Release of Secrets: This method achieves partial fairness such that
one party can get advantage over the other party but this advantage is
polynomially bounded. The idea is to enable each party to release their
secret bit by bit in alternation [14].
– Monetary Penalties: parties are incentivized to complete the protocol fairly,
and if one party receives its output but aborts before the other party does,
the cheating party will have to pay a penalty [25,32,33].
Focusing on blockchains, fair exchange is a precursor for escrow protocols with
cryptocurrencies [25], markets, auctions, games [32] and atomic cross-chain swaps
(ACCS). An ACCS is a task in which multiple parties wish to exchange digital
assets from possibly distinct blockchains, in such a manner where all parties
receive their desired output from another party, or neither does. In this paper
we consider specifically the two-party setting.
Blockchains are decentralized by nature, therefore a core challenge is to design
protocols without a single point of failure in the form of a trusted third party
which takes full custody of users’ funds. Early ACCS protocols leveraged the
blockchain itself as a decentralized trusted party that can lock and release funds
according to pre-programmed rules. The first successful atomic cross-chain swap
construction is credited to TierNolan [40]. It leverages Bitcoin-like script for cre-
ating conditional transactions by the two exchanging parties: each party locks
its funds such that the counterparty can spend them by using the preimage
of an agreed hash value. When one party spends a transaction, it reveals the
secret to the other party which can use it to spend the other conditional trans-
action on the other blockchain. There is also a timeout after which the funds
can be refunded if not redeemed by the counterparty. Such conditional spending
is termed Hashed Timelock Contract (HTLC) and has been specified and ex-
tended in [43] and [46]. Herlihy in [29] has formalized the theory of such atomic
cross-chain swaps. Poelstra [42] has introduced the notion of scriptless scripts
and described how to achieve atomic swaps without the need of explicit scripting
within transactions. Instead, Schnorr signatures [44] are used: the spending of a
transaction reveals a secret merely by the unlocking signature itself, and only to
the counterparty. This has many benefits to blockchains throughput, efficiency
of swap protocols and also to fungibility and privacy. Malavolta et al. [36] has
extended this technique to ECDSA. The latter two studies have opened the
door for scriptless atomic cross-chain swaps for a variety of existing blockchains.
However, they are still limited to blockchains which support either Schnorr or
ECDSA signatures that share the same elliptic curve parameters, namely - the
same group generated from the same fixed generator.
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1.2 Our Contribution
Our solution, the JugglingSwap ACCS protocol, is based on gradual release of
secrets. We observe that there are two ways to transfer value in a blockchain:
– A transaction backed by a digital signature.
– A transfer of a secret key.
To the best of our knowledge, all existing exchange methods use the first
method. The first method naturally has more constraints to it: either it depends
on the scripting capabilities of the underlying blockchain [29,40,46] or on specific
mechanics of the underlying signature scheme [42,36]. The second method is
purely cryptography-dependent with small variance between blockchains and
thus can fit and be reused for many chains architectures.
The vast majority of blockchains tie funds to key pairs of an elliptic curve group
where the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP) is considered hard.
Exchanging between two chains in that case comes down to encrypting the secret
key with the other party’s public key. The two problems that arise:
1. When one party transfers a secret key to a second party it does not lose
knowledge of this secret key. The transfer is like a ”copy” whereas in a
transaction based swap the transfer is like a ”cut”: the sending party loses
access to the funds. The undesired result is that both sending and receiving
parties can use the secret key at the end of the transfer.
2. The exchange is not fair. The first to send the encryption will risk the other
party to not complete the protocol.
We address these issues in the following way: first, we add a layer of threshold
cryptography for secret key management. The cross-chain interoperability re-
mains and we get better security. We start our protocol assuming that each of
the two trading parties, the owners, has a joint two-out-of-two ({2, 2}) address
with the same centralized provider.
Second, we introduce and use a new building block we call Juggling : a novel
verifiable encryption [15] construction for transferring segments of a discrete
logarithm. It allows a prover to encrypt a secret in parts and prove that each
resulting ciphertext is indeed an encryption of a segment of a secret key of some
known public key, under some known encryption key.
Combining these two building blocks, the ACCS protocol goes as follows:
1. The two owners and the provider generate two {3, 3} addresses: one on each
of the two blockchains. Each party keeps a local secret key share.
2. Each owner deposits funds into the {3, 3} address of its source blockchain.
3. The two owners start executing two interleaving Juggling protocols, in order
to achieve a partial fair exchange of their respective secret shares of the
two {3, 3} addresses. In other words - they gradually release their secret
shares, segment by segment. Eventually both owners hold 2 shares of their
counterparty’s {3, 3} address and only 1 share of their own {3, 3} address.
4. Each owner co-signs with the provider in order to withdraw the funds from
the counterparty’s {3, 3} address to its own wallet.
4 Omer Shlomovits, Oded Leiba
During the execution of the Juggling protocol (step 3), in case one party
decides to cheat, the maximal advantage is to be one segment ahead. For small
enough segment bit size this is acceptable. The provider’s role can theoretically
be played by a trusted execution environment (TEE).
The resulting ACCS protocol is scriptless. The blockchain footprint of our method
is between one to two regular transactions on each blockchain. Therefore, it offers
similar benefits as the ACCS protocols in [42,36] in terms of improved blockchain
throughput and more efficient swaps (cheaper than their script-dependant alter-
natives), as well as in fungibility and privacy. On top of that, because Juggling
is applicable on arbitrary groups, JugglingSwap has weak assumptions on the
participating blockchains: it only requires that (1) a threshold variant exists for
the underlying signature algorithm and (2) it is based on ECDLP. Therefore,
the set of pairs of blockchains supported by our protocol strictly contains the
set of possible pairs by prior art, so it offers a higher degree of interoperability.
Finally, We believe that the Juggling protocol can be of separate interest and
used as a building block for other constructions as well.
1.3 Related Work
Gradual Release of Secrets: The notion of partial fairness, originated in
[9,21], was proposed as a way to overcome the impossibility result of perfect
fairness in a setting without a trusted third party [17]. Several protocols, such
as [12,19], were built on top of this security notion. Previous works are mainly
focused on bit by bit release of either the secret itself or a digital signature from
the secret and are not generalizable to elliptic curves DLog. Our protocol is
aimed for gradually releasing a ciphertext encrypting an EC-DLog, where the
encryption correctness is publicly verified for every segment and segment size is
configurable.
Crypto Asset Exchange: Several types of exchange methods exist, most of
them are used in practice today. In centralized-custodial exchanges (e.g. [2]), the
exchange is a trusted third party. Funds are deposited to the exchange platform,
trading is done within the platform and finally the funds can be withdrawn to
a private wallet. From the moment of the deposit and until the withdrawal the
funds are owned by the exchange which at any moment can be hacked, stop
working or become malicious and steal all the funds currently held by the plat-
form.
Centralized but non-custodial trading systems (e.g. [4]) are platforms that guar-
antee security before and after the trade but not in the middle: after funds have
been sent to the system by the user and before they are returned, the user must
trust the trading platform, which again can be hacked, suffer denial of service
(DoS) or become malicious and steal the funds. The presence of such a single
point of trust clearly does not match well the decentralized nature of blockchain
technology.
Another form of exchange is decentralized exchanges (or ”DEXes”, e.g. [1,5]).
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These are trustless platforms that settle trades on the blockchain. They can suf-
fer from security issues such as frontrunning and transaction reordering [7,18].
The on-chain trading makes scalability another issue. Lastly, as they typically
utilize smart contracts, they are limited to support only the assets of the specific
blockchain the contracts are deployed on.
Tesseract [8] is using Intel SGX enclave as a trusted execution engine to provide
a better trusted centralized custodial exchange. The problem with this method
is that SGX can suffer from security vulnerabilities as shown recently [47]. Ar-
wen’s [28] protocol offers centralized non-custodial approach based on building
blocks that are used in the Lightning network protocol [43], namely an escrow
service with off-chain trading and on-chain settlement. The problems with this
protocol are the same as the problems with the Lightning network, for exam-
ple: (1) limited capacity, (2) an exchange needs to have many coins tied up to
escrow channels, (3) fits only blockchains with specific features such as expiry
time transactions and (4) requires a new implementation for every blockchain
added.
2 Preliminaries
Here we provide high level informal definitions for Threshold Signatures, Veri-
fiable Encryption and Bulletproofs range proofs. For a more detailed treatment
we refer to the original papers.
2.1 Threshold Signatures
Let S=(Key-Gen, Sign, Ver) be a signature scheme. Following [24] A {t, n}-
threshold signature scheme T S for S is a pair of protocols (Thresh-Key-Gen,
Thresh-Sign) for the set of parties P1, ..., Pn. Thresh-Key-Gen is a distributed
key generation protocol used by the players to jointly generate a pair (Q, x) of
public/private keys on input a security parameter 1λ . At the end of the protocol,
the private output of party Pi is a value xi such that the values (x1, ..., xn) form
a {t, n}-threshold secret sharing of x. The public output of the protocol contains
the public key Q. Public/private key pairs (Q, x) are produced by Thresh-Key-
Gen with the same probability distribution as if they were generated by the Key-
Gen protocol of the regular signature scheme S. Thresh-Sign is the distributed
signature protocol. The private input of Pi is the value xi. The public inputs
consist of a message m and the public key Q. The output of the protocol is a value
sig ∈Sign(m,x). The verification algorithm for a threshold signature scheme is,
therefore, the same as in the regular centralized signature scheme S
Definition 1. We say that a (t, n)-threshold signature scheme T S =(Thresh-
Key-Gen,Thresh-Sign) is unforgeable, if no malicious adversary who corrupts
at most t− 1 players can produce, with non-negligible (in λ) probability, the
signature on any new (i.e., previously unsigned) message m, given the view of
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the protocol Thresh-Key-Gen and of the protocol Thresh-Sign on input messages
m1, ...,mk which the adversary adaptively chose.
This is analogous to the notion of existential unforgeability under chosen message
attack as defined by [26]. Notice that now the adversary does not just see the
signatures of k messages adaptively chosen, but also the internal state of the
corrupted players and the public communication of the protocols.
We call the special case of t = n, namely a protocol which allows a group
of signers to produce a short, joint signature on a common message where all
participants are required to be honest, a multi-signature.
2.2 Verifiable Encryption
Loosely speaking, verifiable encryption [15] for a relation R is a protocol that
allows a prover to convince a verifier that a given ciphertext is an encryption
under a given public key of a value ω such that (δ, ω) ∈ R for a given δ.
Let (Gen, Enc, Dec) be a public key encryption scheme, and let (pk, sk) be a key
pair. A verifiable encryption scheme proves that a ciphertext encrypts a plaintext
satisfying a certain relationR. The relationR is defined by a generator algorithm
G′ which on input 1λ outputs a description Ψ = Ψ [R,W, ∆] of a binary relation
R on W×∆. We require that the sets R,W and ∆ are easy to recognize (given
Ψ). For δ ∈ ∆, an element ω ∈ W such that (δ, ω) ∈ R is called a witness for
δ. The idea is that the encryptor will be given a value δ, a witness ω for δ, and
then encrypts ω yielding a ciphertext ψ. After this, the encryptor may prove to
another party that ψ decrypts to a witness for δ. In carrying out the proof, the
encryptor will of course need to make use of the random coins that were used by
the encryption algorithm: we denote by Enc’(pk, m) the pair (ψ, coins), where
ψ is the output of Enc(pk,m) and coins are the random coins used by Enc to
compute ψ. In such a proof system, the (honest) verifier will output 0 or 1, with 1
signifying accept. We require that the proof system is sound, in the sense that if a
verifier accepts a proof, then with overwhelming probability, ψ indeed decrypts to
a witness for δ. However, it is convenient, and adequate for many applications, to
take a more relaxed approach: instead of requiring that ψ decrypts to a witness,
we only require that a witness can be easily reconstructed from the plaintext
using some efficient reconstruction algorithm. Such an algorithm recon takes as
input a public key pk, a relation description Ψ = Ψ [R,W, ∆], an element δ ∈ ∆,
and a message m ∈ Mpk ∪ {reject}, and outputs ω ∈ W ∪ {reject}.
Definition 2. A proof system (P,V), together with mutually compatible encryp-
tion scheme (Gen,Enc,Dec), relation generator G′, and reconstruction algo-
rithm recon , form a verifiable encryption scheme, if Correctness, Soundness
and Special honest-verifier zero knowledge properties hold as defined in [15].
2.3 Bulletproofs Range Proofs
Range proofs are proofs that a secret value, which has been encrypted or commit-
ted to, lies in a certain interval. Range proofs do not leak any information about
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the secret value, other than the fact that they lie in the interval. Bulletproofs [13]
can be used as an efficient instantiation of range proofs and work on Pedersen
commitments [41]. Formally, let group element V be a Pedersen commitment
to value v using randomness r. The proof system will convince the verifier that
v ∈ [0, .., 2n − 1]. Bulletproofs are based on Inner Product Argument and main-
tain perfect completeness, perfect special honest verifier zero-knowledge, and
computational witness extended emulation, defined in [13].
3 The Juggling Protocol
3.1 Specification and Definitions
Let G be an elliptic curve group of prime order q with base point (generator) G.
Party Pi knows discrete log (DLog) xi such that Qi = xiG.
Definition 3. m-Segmentation of x is the division of x to m segments [x]k|mk=1
such that x =
∑
k fk[x]k where fk = 2
(k−1)l for segment length in bits l.
Definition 4. We say that a proof is a proof of correct encrypted k-segment
if it is a publicly verifiable zero knowledge proof for encryption scheme {Gen,Enc,
Dec}, public key Y , value δ, relation R, ciphertext ck and parameters k,m such
that ck = Enc(Y, [x]k) is the encryption of [x]k using public key Y , where [x]k is
the k’th segment of m-Segmentation of a witness ω = x such that (δ, ω) ∈ R.
Definition 5. A proof system (P,V), together with mutually compatible encryp-
tion scheme (Gen,Enc,Dec) and parameter m is a Segmented-Verifiable En-
cryption (S-VE) if (a) it is a VE for witness ω and (b) the witness can be
m-Segmented such that for each segment k the prover can prove correct encrypted
k-segment for the same witness ω.
Definition 6. Juggling protocol is S-VE implementation where the witness is
an elliptic curve DLog and segment encryptions and proofs are being released
serially.
It is assumed that there exists a PKI such that all public keys are registered. If
it is not the case, all participants will add a setup phase for key pairs generation
and registration.
3.2 Auxiliary Proofs
All proofs are for public EC parameters G, q, G.
Proof of EC-DDH membership: This is a proof of membership that a tuple
is an Elliptic Curve Decisional Diffie Hellman (DDH) tuple: (G, xG, yG, xyG).
This proof is an adaptation of the proof in [16] for elliptic curves. Proof for the
following relation: the witness is ω = x, the statement is δ = (G1, H1, G2, H2).
The relation R outputs 1 if H1 = xG1 and H2 = xG2.
The protocol works as follows:
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1. The prover sends a1 = αG1 and a2 = αG2 to the verifier with α ∈R Zq
2. The verifier sends a random challenge e ∈R Zq
3. The prover responds with r = α− xe
4. The verifier checks that a1 = rG1 + eH1 and a2 = rG2 + eH2
See [16] for the formal proof.
Proof of correct encryption: This is a proof of knowledge that a pair of
group elements {D,E} form a valid homomorphic ElGamal encryption (”in the
exponent”) [45] using public key Y . Specifically, the witness is ω = (x, r), the
statement is δ = (G, Y,D,E). The relationR outputs 1 if D = xG+rY , E = rG.
1. The prover chooses s1, s2, computes A1 = s1G,A2 = s2Y,A3 = s2G and
sends to the verifier T = A1 +A2, A3.
2. The verifier picks a challenge e.
3. The prover computes z1 = s1 + ex and z2 = s2 + er.
4. The verifier accepts if z1G+ z2Y = T + eD and z2G = A3 + eE.
Proof of correct encryption of DLog: This is a version of the previous
proof where we also know public key Q and want to prove that {D,E} is ho-
momorphic ElGamal encryption that encrypts the DLog of Q, specifically. This
is a proof for the following relation: the witness is ω = (x, r), the statement is
δ = (G, Y,Q,D,E). The relation R outputs 1 if Q = xG, D = xG+rY , E = rG.
To prove this the prover needs (a) to prove knowledge of the DLog of Q in base
G and (b) to prove that (G,E, Y,D − Q) is a DDH tuple. The proof can be
optimized by using the same challenge as follows:
1. The prover chooses s1, s2, computes A1 = s1G,A2 = s2Y,A3 = s2G and
sends A1, A2, A3 to the verifier.
2. The verifier picks a challenge e.
3. The prover computes z1 = s1 + ex and z2 = s2 + er.
4. The verifier accepts if z1G = A1 + eQ and z2G = A3 + eE and z2Y =
A2 + e(D −Q).
The protocols can become non-interactive using Fiat-Shamir transform. Both
Constructions: proof of correct encryption and proof of correct Encryption of
DLog are Sigma protocols [27] with straight forward security proofs. We provide
the proofs in Appendix A.
3.3 Construction
We observe that S-VE can be implemented using an encryption scheme with
homomorphic properties. We choose homomorphic ElGamal encryption as the
base encryption scheme [45]. Figure 1 shows a sequence diagram of the protocol.
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1. Key Generation:
For EC parameters G, q, G and security parameter λ every party chooses
random y ∈ Zq for secret key and computes Y = yG for public key. All
public keys are registered.
2. Encryption:
Upon input (x,Q, Y ) where Q,Y are public keys and x is a secret key
such that Q = xG the encryptor (interchangeably will be called the
prover, depends on operation) divides x to m equal segments (last seg-
ment can be padded with zeros). The segments [x]k|mk=1 should be small
enough to allow extraction of [x]k from [x]kG in polynomial time in the
security parameter.
(a) For every segment k: the encryptor computes the homomorphic El-
Gamal encryption : {Dk, Ek} = {[x]kG + rkY, rkG} for random
rk.
(b) The encryptor publishes Dk|mk=1 together with m Bulletproofs ([13],
non-interactive zero knowledge range proofs) proving that every Dk
is a Pedersen commitment [41] with value smaller than 2l (*).
(c) The encryptor publishes E =
∑
k fkEk and plays the prover in proof
of correct encryption of DLog (3.2) with witness (x,
∑
k fkrk) and
statement (G, Y,Q,D,E), where D =
∑
k fkDk.
(d) An encryption for a segment [x]k will be full once the encryptor pub-
lishes Ek of this segment together with a proof of correct encryption
(3.2).
3. Decryption:
Given a secret key y, for every pair {Dk, Ek}, [x]k can be decrypted
by extracting [x]k from Dk − yEk = [x]kG using algorithm for break-
ing DLog. After all m segments are decrypted x =
∑
k fk[x]k can be
reconstructed.
(*) Except to the MSB segment which is tightly bounded to the l most
significant bits of q.
Juggling Scheme
3.4 Security Analysis
In this section we show that the construction is following the specifications.
Lemma 1. If DDH is hard relative to G, then the scheme {Key Generation,
Encryption, Decryption} is CPA-secure encryption scheme.
Proof sketch: ElGamal encryption in the exponent, like standard ElGamal en-
cryption is CPA-secure under DDH [31,45]. {Dk, Ek} is ElGamal encryption in
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for  in 
rp    RangeProof.Prove( )
 
 
 ProofOfCorrectEncryptionOfDLog.Prove(( ), ( ))
, , , rp
assert RangeProof.Verify(rp , , ) 
assert ProofOfCorrectEncryptionOfDLog.Verify( , ( ))
for  in 
assert ProofOfCorrectEncryption.Verify( , ( ))
 DLog( )
for  in 
 ProofOfCorrectEncryption.Prove(( ), ( ))
, 
Fig. 1. The Juggling protocol sketch. Here P is the encryptor/prover, and V is
the decryptor/verifier. Proofs and encryptions are being released serially by P , where
after each iteration they are being verified and decrypted by V .
Note: when both parties fulfill both roles (each encrypting its own secret), these itera-
tions can interleave: the first party receiving the k’th segment will then send back its
own k’th segment.
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the exponent with randomness rk. Because the randomness rk is changed for
every encryption k ∈ {1, ..,m} the different encryptions are unrelated.
Lemma 2. The proof system {P,V} in Encryption protocol together with ho-
momorphic ElGamal encryption scheme is a proof of correct encrypted k-segment
of DLog of Q, with parameters k, m, Y and security parameter λ.
Proof sketch: The proof system consists of 2m+ 1 proofs given in a specific
order and correspond to gradual release of the ciphertext:
1. m Bulletproofs.
2. Proof of correct encryption of DLog.
3. Proof of correct encryption for first segment
4. ...
5. Proof of correct encryption for the m’th segment
the order of the last m proofs can be different and it is easy to show that it
does not effect security.
The security proof shows that only m + 2 proofs are needed to proof correct
encrypted k-segment. Specifically, for segment k there is no use for the m − 1
proofs of correct encryption for the other segments.
Correctness: This part of the proof is where we need range proofs, which are ef-
ficiently instantiated by Bulletproofs. To intuitively understand why, let us first
describe a possible attack and why bulletproofs can mitigate it. Proof of correct
encryption for the k’th segment proves to the verifier that {Dk, Ek} is homo-
morphic ElGamal encryption using public key Y . The general proof of correct
encryption proves to the verifier a statement about the shifted sum (
∑
k fk) of
the Dk’s and Ek’s. Namely, that {D,E} is Homomorphic ElGamal encryption
of x under public key Y . A simple attack would be to encrypt biased segments
such that the shifted sum will remain the same but each segment encryption will
be decrypted wrong. W.l.o.g let us change only two segments: for segment k to
encrypt the point vk = ukG = [x]kG+bkG = [x]kG+f
−1
k G and for segment k+1
to encrypt the point vk+1 = uk+1G = [x]k+1G+bk+1G = [x]k+1G−f−1k+1G. After
decryption, value extraction and segment summation the result would remain
the same and equal to x but both segment encryptions {Dk, Ek}, {Dk+1, Ek+1}
would have extracted to wrong values. In particular the k’th segment will be
extracted to [x]k + f
−1
k 6= [x]k. The implication of such attack is that if a prover
aborts in the middle of the gradual release, then the decryptor will remain with
nothing while it was expected that it will have all the already published segments
of the secret. We now show how assuming Bulletproof security prevents this spe-
cific attack and then generalize it to all possible changes to encrypted segments
[x]k|mk=1. In our attack there are four cases: one case where both uk, uk+1 are in
range [0, ..., 2l − 1] and three cases where at least one of uk, uk+1 are not in the
range [0, ..., 2l − 1]. For the last three cases it is easy to see that at least one
Bulletproof range proof will not verify with high probability. For the first case
in order for the proof of correct Encryption of DLog to pass we require the sum
bkfk + bk+1fk+1 = nq, to equal a multiple of q, the order of the curve. Every
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option other than n = 0 and bk = bk+1 = 0 will result in at least one of bk, bk+1
out of range [0, ..., 2l − 1] with high probability.
We are now ready to generalize this argument:
Claim 1. For any k segment ciphertext not in the form [x]k + bk with bk inde-
pendent of [x]k verification will pass with negl(λ) probability.
Proof: Assuming correctness of m bulletproofs, proof of correct encryption of
DLog and proof of correct encryption of k segment, if the k’th ciphertext is of
different form it means that at least one other segment must encrypt an ad-
ditional compensating element in the k’th segment to cancel the change. This
additional element would have cause the range proof for this segment to fail with
probability 1− negl(λ).
Claim 2. For any k segment ciphertext in the form [x]k + bk , if bk 6= 0 verifi-
cation will pass with negl(λ) probability.
Proof: The following must hold:
∑
k bkfk = nq If bk 6= 0 for some k at least
one of the bk’s will lead to uk = [x]k + bk > 2
l. Assume to the contrary that
for all k: bk < 2
l − [x]k and q =
∑
k bkfk. Combining this equations we get
x <
∑
k 2
lfk − q. We assume for simplicity that the most significant segment of
q is all-ones. Usually this will restrict the secret key to a very small number such
that for random secret key there is negligible probability that the equation will
hold. If the secret key is not chosen randomly or if we want to make the prob-
ability lower we can simply use secret keys with most significant bit fixed and
equal to 0 (This will not effect security, see discussion in [34] on using secret key
x < q/3). This can be also proven in Encryption time by providing a range proof
on {D,E}. Now the most significant segment can be range proofed to be in the
range [0, ..., 2l−1− 1] such that 2ml−1 +∑m−1k=1 2lfk − q is negative and therefore
assuming bulletproof security, this is possible with only negl(λ) probability.
Soundness: Soundness comes from the soundness of proof of correct encryp-
tion of DLog. There exist algorithm A that given Q and two transcripts of this
proof with two different challenges e 6= e′ outputs ω = x such that Q = xG. This
is enough because algorithm A′ for soundness of the proof of correct encrypted
k-segment of DLog Q can use A and output the k’th segment of the result.
Special honest verifier ZK: All three types of proofs: bulletproof, proof of cor-
rect encryption of DLog and proof of correct encryption have the special HVZK
security property, meaning there exist a simulator S that can output computa-
tional indistinguishable distribution by calling the special HVZK simulators of
the underlying relevant proofs.
Theorem 1. Assuming DDH is hard in G construction 3.3 is a Juggling protocol
according to definition 6 in the random oracle model.
Proof sketch: The proofs of correct encryption combined form a VE of witness x
and DLog relation (Q, x) ∈ R if Q = xG. The prover cannot change witness from
the range proof to the proof of correct encryption of DLog since otherwise the
prover would have broken the binding property of Dk as a commitment, which
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is equivalent to finding the DLog of Y which assume to be hard. Same is true
for changing witness from proof of correct encryption of DLog to the proofs of
correct encryption. Property 2 of S-VE definition holds because Lemma 2 is true
for all k in the m-Segmentation of x. Assuming DDH is hard: The encryption
scheme is CPA secure (lemma 1) and bulletproof is zero knowledge range proof
([13] Definition 13).
4 Atomic Cross-Chain Swap Protocol
4.1 Background
Without many exceptions, all blockchains today are using a digital signature
algorithm that has an existing variant for threshold signing. Most dominant are
ECDSA and Schnorr based signatures (including EdDSA) [11,34,20,23,35,37,22].
In addition BLS signatures show great promise for the blockchain use case [10].
A wallet is a user interfacing software that generates and manages private keys,
constructs and signs messages (transactions) for the relevant cryptocurrencies.
Our wallet design is based on {t, n}-Thresh-Key-Gen and {t, n}-Thresh-Sign
with minimal amount of participants. We aim to fit it to a simple client-server
communication model and therefore take t = n = 2. For the fair exchange pro-
tocol we will need a {3, 3} threshold signature scheme. We assume that multiple
cryptocurrencies are supported by this wallet.
4.2 Roles and Network
We define two roles: owner and provider. The owner is the end user who owns the
funds in the account and holds one secret share of the secret key. The provider
is another share holder of the secret key but does not provide funds to the
shared account. Its role is to provide the additional security in the system aiding
and enabling the owner to generate keys and transact in distributed fashion.
From network perspective, one provider is connected to many owners which to-
gether maintain the provider, for example paying its cost in transaction fees. The
provider can run on any machine: from a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE)
to a machine operated by an incentivized human operator. Multiple providers
can compete for owners. Access to a full node can be done either by both parties
locally or outsourced to a number of other parties.
4.3 Setup
The provider and owner will run {2, 2}-Thresh-Key-Gen. Public keys are used to
generate blockchain addresses. It is assumed that two parties, P1 and P2, that are
sharing the same provider (both run {2, 2}-Thresh-Key-Gen with the provider)
wish to conduct an exchange between two assets on two different chains. In de-
tails, each party Pi holds funds (i.e. tokens) on the blockchain they wish to swap
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from, bi, in an input {2, 2}-address we denote Apiin. The amount of funds held by
each party should be at least the amount they wish to swap, denoted as ci.
Each party Pi would also have a withdraw address we denote A
pi
out, on the
blockchain they wish to swap to, b3−i. This address is not necessarily generated
in advance and can be generated later as the protocol progresses, but for sake of
simplicity we define it in the setup phase. Note: we provide a description in terms
of addresses but an exact description holds with respect to unspent transaction
outputs (UTXOs).
The amounts and maker/taker roles are matched by a public matching engine.
4.4 The Protocol
1. Party P1(P2) runs Juggling.KeyGen to create a decryption/encryption
key pair y1 and Y1 (y2 and Y2). The parties then exchange each other’s
public (encryption) keys Y1 and Y2.
2. P1, P2, S run {3, 3}-Thresh-Key-Gen: The output is public key pk1 and
secret shares xp11 , x
p2
1 , x
s
1 to each party. We call Q
i
1 the local public key
of party i if xi1 is the elliptic curve DLog of Q
i
1. pk1 is used to derive
address a1 in blockchain b1.
3. P1, P2, S run {3, 3}-Thresh-Key-Gen again with outputs pk2, xp12 , xp22 , xs2
and Qi2 for the local public keys. pk2 is used to derive address a2 in
blockchain b2.
4. P1(P2) runs {2, 2}-Thresh-Sign with the provider to transfer fromAp1in(Ap2in)
an amount of c1(c2) tokens to a1(a2). The provider S will broadcast the
two signed transactions to the two blockchains simultaneously.
5. P1 and P2 run Juggling.Encryption with inputs {xp11 , Qp11 , Y2} and {xp22 ,
Qp22 , Y1} respectively. Encryption is done with segmentation enabled: P1
and P2 run Juggling.Encryption up to step (d). If one of the previous
steps failed - abort.
Repeat for k ∈ {1, ...,m}:
(a) P1 sends Ek (encryption of [x
p1
1 ]k) and corresponding proof of correct
encryption.
(b) P2 and S verify proof of correct encryption (aborts if false) and
decrypt the segment encryption. P2 and S send back E
′
k (encryption
of [xp22 ]k) and corresponding proof of correct encryption.
(c) P1 and S verify proof of correct encryption (abort if false) and de-
crypt the segment
6. After decryption is done P1(P2) and S run {3,3}-Thresh-Sign to sign
the withdraw transaction which empties a2(a1) into A
p1
out (A
p2
out).
The transaction can now be broadcast by either S or P1(P2).
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{3,3}-Thresh-Key-Gen
{3,3}-Thresh-Key-Gen
public key to derive
address  in
blockchain 
public key to derive
address  in
blockchain 
depositTx   buildTransaction(blockchain = , from = , to = )
Each :
broadcast(signedDepositTx1 , blockchain = )
broadcast(signedDepositTx2 , blockchain = )
Each :
 Juggling.KeyGen()
{2,2}-Thresh-Sign(depositTx ) {2,2}-Thresh-Sign(depositTx2)
signedDepositTx1 signedDepositTx2
Fig. 2. The Atomic Swaps protocol sketch - part 1
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 Juggling.Enc( )
Each :
assert Juggling.Verify( )
 Juggling.Dec( )
assert Juggling.Verify( )
 Juggling.Dec( )
Each :
{3,3}-Thresh-Sign(withdrawTx1)
withdrawTx   buildTransaction(blockchain = , from = , to = )
{3,3}-Thresh-Sign(withdrawTx2)
for  
Each :
injectSignatureAndBroadcast(withdrawTx , signature = , blockchain = )
Fig. 3. The Atomic Swaps protocol sketch - part 2
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5 Analysis
In this section we give informal discussion on security aspects of the protocol.
First, we show correctness of the scheme. Second, we show that the protocol
guarantees robustness against malicious adversaries and in particular we show
that users of the underlying {2, 2}-key management infrastructure do not need
to make any additional security assumptions when conducting a swap. Finally,
we discuss practical aspects such as cost and privacy.
5.1 Use of Juggling
The security of the scheme relies on the security of Juggling scheme: The protocol
consists basically of two interleaving Juggling protocols, where the two trading
parties are switching the roles of the encryptor and the decryptor. Key generation
is done as part of the creation of {3, 3}-addresses. Encryptor Pi encrypts its
secret share of the {3, 3}-public key with Y3−i. The segmentation property of
the encryption together with the publicly verifiable proofs are taking care of
the partial fairness of the exchange: if segment k is false both parties P1, P2
will either have the same amount of already decrypted segments or one of the
parties will have one less decrypted segment. Assuming small segments and that
the protocol stopped at a stage where extraction of the rest of the secret share
is possible, both parties will need the same resources to get the full secret share.
We discuss later the case where one party aborts very early in the protocol such
that full extraction is not possible.
After all encrypted segments were transferred to the other party and decrypted,
the {3, 3}-addresses are effectively degenerated into {2, 2}-addresses between
the provider S and the counterparty which is the new owner. The owner can
eventually spend from these addresses using the {3, 3}-Thresh-Sign algorithm
by contributing its own secret share created at the key generation phase and
the counterparty’s secret share it has successfully decrypted, together with the
provider’s secret share.
5.2 The Role of the Provider
The provider S can serve as a PKI because it is a centralized authority used
by all owners to derive public keys. This can be strengthened in several ways.
For example: assuming S public key is known to all, S can generate a certificate
for every {2, 2}-address that it takes part in generating. This certificate can be
checked by the participating parties in a swap as well as by an external matching
engine.
Furthermore, The provider can be decentralized (i.e. broken into multiple signing
parties) or run on a TEE. Upon detection of a flawed segment encryption by one
of the parties, S can revoke the party from using the swap service or even from
the wallet service.
A provider may be financially incentivized and charge fees for providing the
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additional security and enabling the fair exchange protocol.
The provider is trusted for:
1. Availability.
2. Fair submission of deposit transactions - in step 4 in the protocol the provider
is required to submit both deposit transactions which fund a1 and a2, or none
in case one of the owners did not send its own transaction.
If assumption (1) is not satisfied, the protocol would not be able to progress
and in most scenarios both parties’ funds would be kept locked. In particular, if
the provider would interact in a {3, 3}-Thresh-Sign with one party but not with
the other, then the latter would have its funds locked but the one which was
able to get the signature has actually succeeded to complete the trade and got
the counterparty’s deposit. If assumption (2) is not satisfied, one party might
lock funds by having its deposit transaction submitted by the provider and con-
firmed, while the other party has aborted and did not stake anything. We should
also wrap within this same assumption the requirement that the provider will
not collude with a party to revert an unconfirmed deposit transaction, which
would lead to the same described situation. Since the input addresses created by
{2, 2}-Thresh-Key-Gen with the provider, it is able to prevent specifically such
attempt.
However, it is important to highlight that in terms of potential outcomes for the
dishonest provider: the provider can freeze funds but it cannot steal funds. The
latter means that it cannot extract secret keys nor trick participants to move
funds to an arbitrary address of its choice. Also note that violations of the afore-
mentioned trust assumptions can be publicly verifiable - an owner may accuse
a provider by presenting a transcript of the threshold key generation protocols
and optionally the Juggling gradual release protocol, so that an external ob-
server of the relevant blockchains can witness that only one deposit or withdraw
transaction has been submitted. That way the provider can be held accountable
for denying service from the owner. Combined with the economical incentive
potential for an honest behavior, these points may give further justification for
the trust assumptions.
5.3 Adversary Model
Our goal is to not add additional assumptions on adversarial behavior on top of
what we already assume for a {2, 2}-wallet design with an owner and a provider,
namely: (1) the provider can stop the service, (2) the provider cannot steal secret
keys. The first assumption is dealt outside the scope of this paper: we assume
that each party has a recovery method for {2, 2}-addresses, independent of the
provider, to reclaim the full secret key. In our protocol, the provider is assumed
to be trusted for the specific points detailed in Section 5.2, namely, availability
and fair submission of deposit transactions which preserve the aforementioned
adversarial behavior limitations (and is not trusted for anything else e.g., for
integrity). The owners P1, P2 can possibly turn malicious at any point. In case
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one of the owners P1, P2 become malicious, the publicly verifiable nature of the
encryption is used to catch the bad actor. The provider S can play the role
of one of the parties. Without loss of generality, say that S plays the role of
(or colludes with) P2. In such a case, note that P1 will not start the Juggling
protocol (i.e. the gradual release secret exchange protocol) until it verifies a
confirmed transaction transferring the expected amount (c2) into the expected
address a2 on the destination blockchain b2. P1 has participated in the creation
of this specific address through the {3, 3}-Thresh-Key-Gen algorithm. Therefore,
the provider S will be able to get P1’s secret share only if it has funded a2 with
sufficient funds which are redeemable by P1. This is equivalent to the honest
case where a counterparty P2 doesn’t collude with the server and deposits the
needed funds.
Lastly, a malicious party may try to withdraw both of the deposits from a1 and
a2. W.l.o.g. say it is P2. Here, P1 has a secret share x
p1
2 it has contributed to the
second {3, 3}-Thresh-Key-Gen, which is required for a successful {3, 3}-Thresh-
Sign and is not revealed to any other party (even not through the Juggling
protocol’s gradual release). So even when the provider colludes with P2, they
will not be able to withdraw funds from a2 without P1’s cooperation.
5.4 Practical Aspects
It is important to note that unlike other ACCS protocols, in this protocol we do
not make any assumptions on the blockchains in the trade. This means that in
the general case either both parties completed the trade or that both parties did
not complete the trade: there is no going back and the funds will stay locked.
If the blockchains used have a time lock mechanism it can smoothly be plugged
in the protocol: S and the parties will sign funding transactions with time locks
such that once they are published if one party decides to go back both parties
will get the refund after the time locks are over.
In terms of interoperability, the protocol enables swaps between popular ECDSA
blockchains, e.g. Bitcoin and Ethereum, and emerging EdDSA blockchains such
as Facebook’s Libra, Algorand and Tezos1. This is not possible with existing
scriptless ACCS protocols [42,36] that require both blockchains to use one of
Schnorr or ECDSA signature schemes that share the same elliptic curve group
generated by the same fixed generator. The footprint of the protocol on the
blockchain is two standard transactions on b1 and two standard transactions on
b2. The cost of the protocol is two standard transactions for every party. Using
the scheme to swap assets on the same blockchain or using it twice to complete
the path b1 → b2 → b1 will result in a mixing solution.
1 Tezos does have support for ECDSA under the curve Secp256k1 as in Bitcoin and
Ethereum, but exchanging into an address of a different signing algorithm may not
be ideal in terms of wallets and tools support.
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6 Implementation
As a proof of concept we show an atomic swap between Bitcoin and Ethereum.
For key management system we implemented Lindell’s [34] {2, 2} ECDSA key
generation and signing protocols (protocols 3.1 and 3.2 in [34]) for Elliptic curve
Secp256k1. This is the digital signature scheme and elliptic curve used by both
Bitcoin and Ethereum. Our code abstracts both the elliptic curve layer and the
digital signature layer such that other types of elliptic curves and digital sig-
natures can be plugged in easily. We tested it with curve25519 and library we
wrote for multi party Schnorr signatures based on [39].
We used m = 32 segments of l = 8 bits for the 256 bit keys. We used brute-force
to find the DLogs which is not optimal and in practice one of known protocols
that can achieve 2l/2 time should be used.
We implemented the fair exchange protocol for the case where the provider is not
allowed to play P1 or P2. This allows to relax the requirement on the of {3, 3}
addresses and use only {2, 2}-Thresh-key-generation and Signing. The cryptog-
raphy layer is written in Rust. The wrapping communication layer between the
parties and their blockchain nodes are written in JavaScript (Node.js). It is open
source and can be found in [3].
6.1 Future Work
We plan to add support for more blockchains: connecting other types of elliptic
curves and threshold signature algorithms to the system. For threshold-ECDSA
we will switch to a newer protocol [23] with support for {3, 3} addresses. We
wish to run experiments to set up optimal system parameters (i.e. optimal bit
length l) and to measure performance.
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A Security for Auxiliary Proofs
Here we provide security proofs that the auxiliary proofs from section 3.2 are
secure.
A.1 Proof of Correct Encryption:
– Completeness: z1G+ z2Y = s1G+ exG+ s2Y + erY = A1 +A2 + e(xG+
rY ) = T + eD. z2G = s2G+e rG = A3 + eE
– Special Soundness: Given two transcripts {T,A3, e, z1, z2} and
{T,A3, e′, z′1, z′2} it is easy to extract r from e, e′, z2, z′2 and the x from
e, e′, z1, z′1.
– Special HVZK: Given the statement G, Y,D,E and e, choose random z2 ∈
Zq and compute A3 = z2G − eE. Choose random z1 ∈ Zq, and compute
T = z1G+ z2Y − eD.
A.2 Proof of Correct Encryption of DLog:
– Completeness: z1G = s1G+exG = A1+eQ, z2G = s2G+erG = A3+eE,
z2Y = s2Y + erY = A2 + eQ+ erY − eQ = A2 + e(D −Q)
– Special Soundness: Given two transcripts {A1, A2, A3, e, z1, z2} and
{A1, A2, A3, e′, z′1, z′2} it is easy to extract r from e, e′, z2, z′2 and the x from
e, e′, z1, z′1.
– Special HVZK: Given the statement G, Y,Q,D,E and e, choose random
z2 ∈ Zq and compute A3 = z2G−eE, A2 = z2Y −e(D−Q). Choose random
z1 ∈ Zq, and compute A1 = z1G− eQ.
